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TWO WRONGS MAKE A WRONG: A 
CHALLENGE TO PLEA BARGAINING AND 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCE STATUTES 
THROUGH THEIR INTEGRATION 
Kevin O’Keefe* 
 In the modern criminal justice system, adherence to expedience and 
pragmatism have contributed to the prevalence of two practices that have 
questionable constititional bases: plea bargains and postconviction civil 
penalties.  Each practice has been challenged in the courts individually and 
has survived judicial scrutiny.  And as these two practices have become 
more commonplace, their continued intersection and interaction has 
become increasingly inevitable; however, even a superficial analysis of this 
combination of plea bargaining and postconviction civil penalties 
demonstrates that the constitutionality of the two practices can no longer be 
justified by an uneasy compromise with practicality. 
This Comment is intended to illustrate the nature and the extent of the 
intersecting practices of plea bargaining and postconviction civil penalties.  
Furthermore, by embracing the contract-based approach to the theoretical 
justification of plea bargaining, this Comment argues that retroactive 
postconviction civil penalty statutes—in particular the most recently 
enacted federal sexual offender registration and notification law—should 
not survive a due process challenge and accordingly should not apply to 
plea-convicted defendants.  At the very least, this Comment hopes to 
demonstrate that the individually debatable practices of plea bargaining 
and postconviction civil penalties have grown and interwoven to such an 
extent that, in light of the basic dictates of fairness and due process, the 
state has finally gone too far. 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, May 2010; B.A., Harvard 
College, 2004.  I would like to thank the 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 Editorial Boards and 
Staff of the Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology for the inestimable amount of assistance 
and patience that went along with the editing and publication of this Comment.  Any errors 
in the foregoing comment are the responsibility of the author. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The prevalence of plea bargaining in the U.S. criminal justice system 
is undisputed, though the desirability of such a system has been a subject of 
considerable debate for decades.1  Regardless of the constitutional 
improprieties and injustices that both sides of the debate recognize as flaws 
inherent to the system, both sides acknowledge that plea bargaining derives 
most of its justification from the principles of contract.2  The individual 
defendant exchanges certain constitutional rights for a more lenient 
sentence with absolute certainty.3  The prosecution, as the agent of the state, 
foregoes the opportunity to pursue a higher sentence for the defendant and 
saves the time and expense of proving the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.4  A closer inspection of the particulars of the plea 
bargaining system reveals that the plea bargain is not the classical 
theoretical bargain.5  However, the basic justification for its existence is 
that, at its most fundamental level, the plea bargain is a mutual exchange of 
considerations between two parties: the individual defendant and the state.6 
Much like plea bargaining, postconviction civil penalties, arising out 
of what are known as collateral consequence statutes, have been part of the 
U.S. criminal justice system for a considerable period of time.7  At least 
 
1 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: 
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931 (1983); Albert W. 
Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652 (1981); Albert W. 
Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1979); Russell D. Covey, 
Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237 
(2008); Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1906 (1992); 
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Pleas of Guilty and the Loss of Constitutional Rights: The Current 
Price of Pleading Guilty, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1265 (1978); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea 
Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, 
Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992). 
2 See generally Scott & Stuntz, supra note 1.  See also Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 
1974-75; Schulhofer, supra note 1, at 1980. 
3 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 1, at 1914. 
4 See Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 1975. 
5 In addition to a bilateral asymmetry of information, the parties to a plea bargain will 
always be of extremely disproportionate power; setting aside the instances of bargaining 
among multiple co-defendants, the only parties to a plea bargain are the individual defendant 
and the entire state law enforcement body.  For further discussion, see infra Part II.A. 
6 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 1, at 1912-13. 
7 See Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal 
Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1061-64 (describing 
disenfranchisement statutes that were applied against convicted offenders during both the 
colonial period and the years following the ratification of the Constitution).  For a brief 
survey of the more common collateral consequence statutes, see Michael Pinard, An 
Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry 
Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 634-39 (2006). 
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with respect to convicted sexual offenders, the use of collateral 
consequences to punish individual defendants further after sentencing has 
become a pervasive practice in the United States.  Most notably, on 
September 13, 1994, the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and 
Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act (Wetterling Act) was signed 
into law.8  Individual states have been creating their own systems of sexual 
offender registration since 1947;9 however, with the enactment of the 
Wetterling Act, states are now required to devise and implement sexual 
offender registration systems.10  While this was by no means the first 
instance of a collateral consequence statute, nor the beginning of the trend 
towards imposing civil penalties against convicted sexual offenders,11 the 
passage of the Wetterling Act represented the first federal imposition of 
collateral consequences upon any criminal defendant convicted of a 
sexually based offense.12  Through subsequent amendments and bills, 
Congress has supplemented this initial mandate with many more 
requirements for the state registration systems, most recently in the Adam 
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (Walsh Act).13 
Plea bargaining and collateral consequence statutes are two entirely 
separate practices, but are similar in the sense that neither seems to comport 
with the classic model of criminal justice: a trial followed by a sentence 
imposed by the trial court.  Additionally, both practices are ubiquitous in 
the modern criminal justice system.  By way of illustration, in the federal 
court system, guilty pleas account for 96% of convictions,14 and over forty 
different post-sentence restrictions automatically apply to individuals 
convicted of felonies.15  Accordingly, any analysis of collateral 
consequence statutes in the modern criminal justice system needs to be 
conducted with an eye toward plea bargaining, and vice versa.  And because 
 
8 Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 14071 (2006)). 
9 Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification: Past, 
Present, and Future, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3, 5 (2008). 
10 Wetterling Act § 170101(f)(1). 
11 New Jersey is widely credited with enacting the forerunner of modern sex offender 
collateral-consequence statutes, Megan’s Law, in 1994.  See Logan, supra note 9, at 5; see 
also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 (West 2005). 
12 See Wetterling Act § 170101(f)(1); Logan, supra note 9, at 5. 
13 Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 16901 
(2006)). 
14 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS fig.C (2008), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2008/FigC.pdf. 
15 See COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE CRIM. SANCTIONS, A.B.A. & PUB. DEFENDER SERV. FOR 
D.C., INTERNAL EXILE: COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION IN FEDERAL LAWS AND 
REGULATIONS app. 2 (2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/cecs/internalexile.pdf 
[hereinafter INTERNAL EXILE]. 
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these individual practices are so prevalent, the constitutional analyses and 
theoretical bases of plea bargaining and collateral consequences should be 
revisited with emphasis on their integration. 
This Comment focuses on the sexual offender collateral consequence 
statutes, and the Walsh Act in particular, for two reasons.  First, sexual 
offender collateral consequences have often been (and now must be, per the 
Walsh Act) applied retroactively.16  In other words, defendants who were 
convicted and served their sentences completely prior to the enactment of a 
collateral consequence statute are still subject to registration and 
notification requirements.17  Second, offenders are assessed civil penalties 
by way of the collateral consequence statute based solely on their previous 
conviction.18  A defendant’s particular conviction determines whether and 
how the collateral consequence statute is applied.19  There are certainly 
other retroactively applied collateral consequences, but sexual offender 
registration systems under the Walsh Act provide the clearest example of 
how the legal justifications for collateral consequence statutes may not 
comport with the criminal justice system as it functions today. 
Courts have upheld the use of plea bargains to waive constitutional 
rights in exchange for a presumably more lenient sentence, most notably in 
Brady v. United States.20  Similarly, retroactive collateral consequence 
statutes have been found constitutional in response to challenges based on 
both the Ex Post Facto Clause21 and procedural due process requirements.22  
The problematic aspect, and the thrust of this Comment, is that retroactive 
collateral consequence statutes violate the basic justifications for the guilty 
plea.  In short, when an individual defendant bargains with the state for a 
 
16 Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (2009) (“The 
requirements of the [Walsh Act] apply to all sex offenders, including sex offenders convicted 
of the offense for which registration is required prior to the enactment of that Act.”). 
17 Id. 
18 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety (Walsh) Act of 2006 § 111(2)-(4), Pub. L. 
No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (defining sex offender tiers through convictions of crimes that 
are comparable to a specified list of federal crimes). 
19 By way of comparison, numerous states had enacted and used forward looking 
approaches prior to the Walsh Act.  Those states would assess the defendant’s risk of 
recidivism upon release based on a number of statutory or regulatory factors.  That risk 
assessment would in turn define the extent of the duration of required registration and also 
the extent of community notification that his or her release would entail.  See e.g., ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 12-12-917 (Supp. 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178K(1) (LexisNexis 1999 
& Supp. 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8 (West 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 11-37.1-6(b) 
(Supp. 2008). 
20 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
22 E.g., Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003). 
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specific, more lenient sentence,23 a retroactive collateral consequence 
statute is a unilateral change in terms by the state after the bargain, which 
adds to the defendant’s offered consideration, consisting of the bargained-
for sentence.  This Comment argues that such retroactive statutes are a 
breach of the original contract by the state, and therefore plea-bargained 
defendants that are subject to these statutes should have some remedy 
available, such as non-application of the retroactive statute if not outright 
rescission of the original agreement. 
In a purely contractual context, a plea-convicted defendant’s right to 
challenge the application of retroactive statutes seems fair and intuitive, but 
there are several legal hurdles to overcome before an argument for remedy 
or rescission based on contract law will appear legally legitimate and non-
frivolous.  As a threshold matter, a purely contractual approach to revisiting 
a plea bargain is almost irrelevant in practice, because principles of contract 
law and criminal law have had an uneasy coexistence with respect to plea 
bargaining.  Quite simply, there are certain inherent aspects of plea 
bargaining that are antithetical to the assumptions of the classic theoretical 
contract.24   
Furthermore, there are several established principles of contract law 
that a defendant would have to overcome in order to receive a remedy.  The 
sovereign acts doctrine, as originally recognized in Horowitz v. United 
States,25 creates a considerable hurdle for an individual to properly assert 
that the legislative acts of the state can be viewed as acts of a contracting 
party.26  Additionally, the question of risk assumption in the context of 
guilty pleas has considerable bearing on whether stronger remedies, such as 
non-application of the statute or rescission, may be justified.27  Finally, 
there is the issue of whether application of these retroactive collateral 
consequence statutes can even be considered a breach of the agreement.28 
 
23 It is the court, and not the government, that has the ultimate sentencing authority in 
every plea bargain case.  However with very few exceptions, the resulting sentence in actual 
practice is always either the bargained sentence or within the bargained range of sentences.  
See Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 1973. 
24 See Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 1974; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 1, at 1911-13.  
Several examples are discussed infra Part III.A. 
25 267 U.S. 458 (1925). 
26 Id. at 461. 
27 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154 (1981). 
28 As with any contract, the issue of whether there is a breach is not always clear, 
particularly in light of the fact that the collateral consequence statutes at issue will have been 
enacted years after many of the plea bargains were thought to have been fully performed.  
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of existence of breach in the context of 
performance of services contemplated in a plea bargain.  See, e.g., Mabry v. Johnson, 467 
U.S. 504, 509-11 (1984). 
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Even if the ultimate remedies of rescission or non-application of the 
civil penalty are not available, this Comment intends to demonstrate that 
while plea bargaining and retroactive collateral consequences are both 
accepted and prevalent practices in the U.S. criminal justice system, the 
combination of the two is not theoretically justified.  At the very least, one 
or both systems should be reevaluated in light of their conflicting 
rationalizations. 
This Comment begins with short histories of guilty pleas and collateral 
consequence statutes in the U.S. criminal justice system.  In particular, Part 
II describes the rise in prominence of plea bargaining and the rationale for 
its legitimacy in the law, paying particular attention to the pragmatic 
justifications driving the increase in guilty pleas and forming the basis for 
the legality of the practice.  It then goes on to describe the history of 
collateral consequences, focusing on the largely recent developments in 
sexual offender registration and notification laws.  In particular, it explains 
that the newly mandated federal system for classification of offenders and 
its retroactive application eviscerates the bargains contemplated by guilty 
pleas.  Stringent notification and registration requirements are levied upon 
defendants who had bargained for, and may have even completed, particular 
sentences prior to the enactment of the new federal law.  Part II concludes 
with a survey of the previous constitutional challenges to sexual offender 
registration and notification statutes along with a brief description of why 
they were unsuccessful.  In short, conviction-based offender classification 
systems do not violate procedural due process because their application is 
determined by the outcome of a criminal trial, and registration and 
notification laws do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because they are 
civil and non-punitive measures.29  Finally, previous substantive due 
process challenges have failed because there is neither a history nor 
tradition of not having to register oneself for past sexual offenses. 
Part III of this Comment focuses on the contractual rationale for plea 
bargains and serves to describe the underlying basis for my eventual 
argument.  First, it briefly describes the contract-based arguments for and 
against plea bargaining.  It then continues with a more detailed analysis of 
three Supreme Court cases that invoke doctrines of contract law to 
adjudicate cases concerning alleged breaches of plea agreements.  These 
three cases in turn create a limited jurisprudence for analyzing whether plea 
agreements are breached by subsequent state action. 
 
29 The fact that registration and notification statutes are constitutional because they rely 
solely upon the outcomes of criminal trials, but are simultaneously deemed civil sanctions, 
did not escape the author’s attention.  This Comment does not attempt to reconcile these 
conflicting rationales because the author is simply unable to do so. 
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Part IV builds on the jurisprudence derived from these three cases and 
explains how it informs the subsequent analysis of the integration of 
collateral consequence statutes and plea agreements.  In short, if the state is 
the bargaining partner to the plea agreement, and the enactment and 
enforcement of a collateral consequence statute is a subsequent act by that 
party to the contract, then compelling compliance with that statute should 
be considered a breach of that plea agreement by the state.  Part IV 
continues the plea agreement breach analysis by casting the hypothetical 
defendant’s claim as a substantive due process challenge.  In contrast to the 
cases recounted in Part II that were based on the defendant’s right to not 
have his or her conviction publicized, this challenge relies instead on the 
defendant’s right to have his or her plea agreement enforced—a right that 
has considerably more history and tradition. 
Having identified a possibly successful challenge to the retroactive 
enforcement of collateral consequence statutes, Part V concludes the 
Comment by addressing two responses to this contract-based challenge: the 
severability doctrine and whether the defendant has assumed the risk of a 
subsequently enacted collateral consequence statute.  While both defenses 
are plausible, neither is particularly conclusive, and, in light of the obvious 
unfairness resulting from retroactive collateral consequence statutes, neither 
should be fatal to the defendant’s hypothetical claim. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  GUILTY PLEAS 
It is unclear when the practice of plea bargaining began, as it is 
difficult to determine what sentences were the result of a bargain, as 
opposed to the result of the normal processes of criminal law.30  Prior to the 
1920s, the earliest reported instances of plea bargaining in judicial opinions 
concerned the courts’ disapproval of the practice.31  However, studies 
suggest that the Prohibition era, possibly due to its corresponding expansion 
of criminal codes, was when the widespread usage and acceptance of the 
guilty plea in the United States was first acknowledged.32  Surveys of the 
criminal justice systems conducted during this period revealed that in at 
 
30 Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, supra note 1, at 1-6. 
31 Id. at 5-6. 
32 Id.; GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH 6 (2003) (“The first wave, in the 
1920’s and early 1930’s, marked the true age of plea bargaining’s discovery.”). 
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least eight major cities, the rate of felony convictions obtained through 
guilty pleas was well over 70%.33 
Plea bargaining continued without clear judicial legitimacy until the 
Supreme Court officially sanctioned the practice in 1970 in Brady v. United 
States.34  In Brady, the defendant initially pleaded not guilty to kidnapping 
with the aggravated circumstance of inflicting harm upon the victim.35  
Upon learning that his codefendant had pleaded guilty and was willing to 
testify against him, the defendant pleaded guilty in exchange for a fifty-year 
prison sentence and foreclosure of the possibility of a death sentence.36  The 
defendant challenged the conviction on the basis of coercion, realized 
through the threat of testimony from the codefendant and potential death 
penalty if he went to trial.37  Citing the prevalence of the pleas and the 
infeasibility of abolition of the practice, the Court upheld the conviction and 
validated the practice of plea bargaining.38  The Court’s legal basis for the 
decision was that juries and judges have considerable discretion to sentence 
defendants; thus, precluding the maximum penalty is a rational choice by 
the defendant,39 and guilty pleas are constitutional so long as they meet the 
knowing and voluntary requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.40  The Court then specifically noted the “mutuality of 
advantage” that is inherent in the plea bargaining process to further support 
its holding.41 
At the time of the Brady decision, over 75% of all criminal convictions 
were obtained through guilty pleas.42  In June of 2009, the Court noted that 
guilty pleas now account for over 95% of state and federal convictions.43 
 
33 Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, supra note 1, at 26.  In 1908, the federal 
rate of convictions by guilty plea was about 50%; it increased to 72% in 1916 and was 
almost 90% by 1925.  Id. at 27. 
34 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
35 Id. at 743. 
36 Id. at 743-44. 
37 Id. at 749-51. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 751. 
40 Id. at 751-52.  “Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must 
address the defendant personally in open court and determine that the plea is voluntary and 
did not result from force, threats, or promises (other than promises in a plea agreement).”  
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2). 
41 Brady, 397 U.S. at 752. 
42 Id. 
43 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009). 
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B.  COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
The practice of attaching civil penalties to felony and misdemeanor 
convictions is just as pervasive as the practice of plea bargaining.  
Depending on one’s definition, collateral consequences, at least with 
respect to felony disenfranchisement, have origins that predate the U.S. 
criminal justice system.44  Currently, federal and state collateral 
consequence statutes encompass a number of facets of everyday life, 
including eligibility for welfare, public housing, student aid, and alien 
residency; the right to vote and serve on a jury; and restrictions on 
employment, including the military.45  
Sexual offender registration, on the other hand, has a considerably 
shorter history.  California was the first state to enact a general registration 
system for all convicted sexual offenders in 1947.46  Between 1947 and 
1993, thirteen states and the federal government passed sexual offender 
registration laws,47 but it was not until 1994 that sexual offender registration 
gained national prominence with New Jersey’s passage of Megan’s Law.48  
Like all of the previously enacted statutes, New Jersey’s Megan’s Law 
created a registration system,49 but unlike all but one other state,50 the New 
Jersey statute also created a community notification system.51  The 
previously enacted federal statute, the Wetterling Act, mandated that the 
states implement registration programs, but merely permitted the states to 
 
44 Avi Brisman, Toward a More Elaborate Typology of Environmental Values: 
Liberalizing Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws and Policies, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & 
CIV. CONFINEMENT 283, 331 (2007). 
45 Pinard, supra note 7, at 635-36 (citations omitted); see also INTERNAL EXILE, supra 
note 15, app. 2. 
46 Logan, supra note 9, at 5. 
47 See id. at 5-6. 
48 Id.; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 (West 2005). 
49 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2 (West 2005). 
50 Washington was actually the first state to allow for community notification.  1990 
Wash. Sess. Laws 25 § 117 (“Public agencies are authorized to release relevant and 
necessary information regarding sex offenders to the public when the release of the 
information is necessary for public protection.”).  It is unclear why New Jersey’s 
community-notification law, and not Washington’s, triggered such interest nation-wide and 
motivated the federal government to subsequently mandate notification laws in each state. 
51 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-6 (West 2005): 
Within 45 days after receiving notification . . . that an inmate convicted of or adjudicated 
delinquent for a sex offense . . . is to be released from incarceration and after receipt of 
registration as required therein, the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality where the 
inmate intends to reside shall provide notification . . . of that inmate’s release to the community.  
If the municipality does not have a police force, the Superintendent of State Police shall provide 
notification. 
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create community notification systems.52  Shortly after New Jersey enacted 
its Megan’s Law, Congress amended the Wetterling Act with its own 
Megan’s Law in 1996, this time requiring states to implement their own 
community notification systems in addition to the existing offender 
registration requirement.53 
Congress has continued to amend the requirements for state sexual 
offender registration and notification systems following the federal 
Megan’s Law.54  For the purposes of this Comment, the most recent 
amendment, the Walsh Act,55 is the most significant.  In particular, it 
changed the existing state requirements for registration and notification in 
two fundamental ways.  First, states must now apply the modified sexual 
offender registration and notification requirement provisions of the act 
retroactively.56  Second, the Walsh Act requires that states follow a three-
tiered notification system based solely upon the conviction of the sexual 
offender (the “backward-looking” approach).57   
Tiered notification systems that are based on the severity of a 
defendant’s conviction were not particularly new; numerous states had 
already implemented such an approach58 in which more serious crimes 
result in community notification, but less serious crimes only result in 
notification to law enforcement.59  This backward-looking approach was not 
universal, however, as approximately fifteen other states instead used 
“forward-looking” approaches, in which tier designations that determine the 
extent of community notification are based not just on the severity of the 
offender’s conviction, but also on that particular offender’s risk of 
recidivism.60  Therefore, the problematic aspect of this provision of the 
 
52 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 
Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14701(b) (2006)). 
53 Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, § 2, 110 Stat. 1345, 1345 (1996) (“The designated 
State law enforcement agency . . . shall release relevant information that is necessary to 
protect the public concerning a specific person required to register under this section . . . .”) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14701(e)(2) (2006)). 
54 Reforms included the creation of a national registration system primarily for law 
enforcement purposes and a mandate for states to publish registration information on the 
internet.  Logan, supra note 9, at 6. 
55 Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 16901 
(2006)). 
56  Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (2009). 
57 Walsh Act § 111. 
58 Among them, the New Jersey system created by Megan’s Law.  N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:7-1 (West 2005). 
59 Id. 
60 Logan, supra note 9, at 10.  For example, the New Jersey Megan’s Law, enacted in 
1994, determined notification tier designations through the analysis of these non-exclusive 
factors: 
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Walsh Act is that it requires that each state use the backward-looking 
approach for community notification, which is in direct conflict with the 
forward-looking approach that a number of states had individually 
implemented and used for some time.61   
The significance of these two provisions of the Walsh Act is that, 
theoretically, any individual in any state who has pleaded guilty to a sexual 
offense for a specified sentence at any time is now subject to, at a 
minimum, the registration and notification requirements specified in the act, 
regardless of whether or not the individual had pleaded guilty to the offense 
or even served the agreed sentence before the enactment of the Walsh Act 
in 2006.62  Federalism concerns aside,63 the Walsh Act embodies a 
 
(1) Conditions of release that minimize risk of re-offense, including but not limited to whether the 
offender is under supervision of probation or parole; receiving counseling, therapy or treatment; 
or residing in a home situation that provides guidance and supervision; 
(2) Physical conditions that minimize risk of re-offense, including but not limited to advanced age 
or debilitating illness; 
(3) Criminal history factors indicative of high risk of re-offense, including: (a) Whether the 
offender’s conduct was found to be characterized by repetitive and compulsive behavior; 
(b) Whether the offender served the maximum term; (c) Whether the offender committed the sex 
offense against a child; 
(4) Other criminal history factors to be considered in determining risk, including: (a) The 
relationship between the offender and the victim; (b) Whether the offense involved the use of a 
weapon, violence, or infliction of serious bodily injury; (c) The number, date and nature of prior 
offenses;  
(5) Whether psychological or psychiatric profiles indicate a risk of recidivism; 
(6) The offender’s response to treatment; 
(7) Recent behavior, including behavior while confined or while under supervision in the 
community as well as behavior in the community following service of sentence; and 
(8) Recent threats against persons or expressions of intent to commit additional crimes. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(b) (West 2005) (emphasis added). 
61 Logan, supra note 9, at 10. 
62 See Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (2009); see also 
Walsh Act § 124 (“Each jurisdiction shall implement this title before . . . 3 years after the 
date of the enactment of this Act . . . .”).  States that do not implement the requirements of 
the Walsh Act will be subject to a 10% decrease in federal crime prevention funding unless 
the state’s highest court rules that certain requirements would violate that state’s 
constitution.  See id. § 125. 
63 Several district courts have held that certain aspects of the Walsh Act are not within 
Congress’ power under the Interstate Commerce Clause.  E.g., United States v. Powers, 544 
F. Supp. 2d 1331 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (noting that the Congress does not have power under 
Interstate Commerce Clause to criminalize failure to register by an individual convicted of a 
state sex offense).  For a more thorough treatment of the federalism problems that the 
mandated registration requirements of the Adam Walsh Act creates, see Logan, supra note 9, 
at 7-13. 
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significant change in terms for those sexual offenders who bargained for a 
specific sentence. 
C.  PREVIOUS CHALLENGES TO SEXUAL OFFENDER REGISTRATION 
1.  Procedural Due Process 
In Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe,64 the state agency 
appealed district court and circuit court decisions enjoining it from 
employing its sexual offender registration and notification system.65  An 
unnamed individual who was subject to the sexual offender registration and 
notification system of Connecticut successfully brought suit under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the statute creating the registration and 
notification system deprived him of a liberty interest—namely his right to 
due process.66  At the time of the suit, Connecticut’s registration system 
was, like the systems required by the Walsh Act, backward-looking: it 
determined the extent of community notification based on the offense of 
conviction.67  At the district and circuit court levels, Doe successfully 
argued that the registration requirements violated his right to due process 
because he was not afforded a hearing to dispute the determination that he 
was “currently dangerous.”68  However, the Supreme Court reversed.69  
Declining to reach the issue of whether the registration and publication 
requirements infringe on a liberty interest,70 the Court held that Doe’s 
dangerousness was irrelevant under Connecticut’s registration statute since 
it relied solely upon the previous conviction.71  Since Doe’s tier designation 
was not based on his current dangerousness, but rather on the outcome of 
his trial, the state was not required to provide a hearing before imposing the 
sanction, and therefore did not violate procedural due process by failing to 
 
64 538 U.S. 1 (2003). 
65 Id. at 6-7. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 4-5. 
68 Id. at 7. 
69 Id. at 8. 
70 Id. at 7.  The Court’s refusal to address whether there was a liberty interest at issue 
expressly left open the possibility that such an interest may exist and provide the proper 
basis for a substantive due process claim.  See id. at 8 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that in 
order to succeed in challenging the Connecticut registration system, Doe would have to 
claim that a liberty interest was implicated and “that the liberty interest in question was so 
fundamental as to implicate so-called ‘substantive’ due process”).  While several circuit 
courts have addressed substantive due process claims, the Supreme Court thus far has not.  
See infra Part II.C.3. 
71 Id. 
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do so.72  It should be noted that states that employ forward-looking 
approaches to tier designations do provide hearings for the individuals to 
challenge the assessment of their current dangerousness.73 
2.  Ex Post Facto Clause 
In Smith v. Doe, the State of Alaska appealed a decision of the Ninth 
Circuit that enjoined the state from enforcing its retroactive, backward-
looking sexual offender registration and notification system because it 
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.74  This case is particularly relevant 
because the sexual offenders who brought the § 1983 suit had pleaded nolo 
contendere to their initial offenses and completed their sentences well 
before the state registration system was created.75 
The first step for the Court was to determine whether the law was 
meant to impose punishment or to impose civil, non-punitive measures.76  
Accordingly, the Court looked to “the statute’s text and its structure to 
determine the legislative objective.”77  The stated primary intent of the 
statute, according to the legislature, is “protecting the public from sex 
offenders,”78 which is in keeping with the purposes of the state’s criminal 
law.  The registration requirements were codified in Alaska’s criminal 
procedure code, but the notification provisions were codified in the state’s 
“Health, Safety, and Housing Code.”79  Finally, after the enactment of the 
 
72 Id. at 7-8. 
73 E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, § 178M (West 1999) (“An offender may seek 
judicial review . . . of the board’s final classification and registration requirements.”); OFFICE 
OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., STATE OF N.J., ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY 
NOTIFICATION LAWS § 2 (revised 2007), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/ 
megan/meganguidelines-2-07.pdf (“The decision [of level of risk of re-offense] is subject to 
judicial review in accordance with the procedures established by the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey.”). 
However, such systems with individual determinations of “current dangerousness” 
could give rise to equal protection claims.  See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 10 
(Souter, J., concurring) (noting that legislative line-drawing among a class of convicted 
sexual offenders would be open to challenges under the Equal Protection Clause).  Also, 
Professor Logan posits that Congress specifically rejected the forward-looking approach and 
chose the backward-looking approach for the Walsh Act, because it would not be challenged 
on procedural due process grounds in light of Connecticut Department of Public Safety.  See 
Logan, supra note 9, at 13. 
74 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
75 Id. at 91. 
76 Id. at 92 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 93 (quoting 1994 ALASKA SESS. LAWS ch. 41, §1). 
79 Id. at 94. 
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system, Alaska amended its Rules of Criminal Procedure so that the court 
must notify defendants of the registration and notification implications of 
sexual offenses before it can accept a guilty plea.80  The Court found that 
since there is nothing facially apparent from the statute to suggest 
otherwise, the statute’s purpose is civil and non-punitive.81 
The Court’s next step was to determine whether the effects of the 
statute surpass its civil purpose to such an extent that the statute is in fact a 
punitive measure.82  Citing the seven-factor test from Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez,83 the Court used five factors as a framework for its analysis: 
[W]hether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme: [1] has been regarded in 
our history and traditions as a punishment; [2] imposes an affirmative disability or 
restraint; [3] promotes the traditional aims of punishment; [4] has a rational 
connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or [5] is excessive with respect to this purpose.84 
Though the Court remarked at some length upon the similarity of the 
statute’s notification provisions to colonial era shaming punishments,85 it 
found that the purpose of the scheme is to inform the public, which is non-
punitive.86  Furthermore, the Court stated that the registration and 
notification requirements are neither a disability nor a restraint.87  
Additionally, the primary purpose of the statute is to deter future crimes and 
not for retribution.88  By maintaining its focus on the statute’s purpose of 
ensuring safety, the Court found that the measures are reasonable in light of 
the non-punitive objective and are not excessive in light of (1) the high risk 
of recidivism, (2) the state’s entitlement to categorically judge all convicted 
 
80 Id. at 95.  The rule cited by the Court is the same rule in place today; courts are 
required to “infor[m] the defendant in writing of the requirements of [the sexual offender 
registration law] and, if it can be determined by the court, the period of registration 
required.”  ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 11(C)(4).  It should be noted that this is the specific type of 
protection—informing the criminal defendant of postconviction consequences prior to 
acceptance of a plea—that would have barred the defendants in the present case, and any 
defendant for that matter, from asserting unfair bargaining on the part of the government.  
For a more detailed discussion on notification of criminal defendants in the bargaining 
process, see infra Part V.B. 
81 Smith, 538 U.S. at 93, 96. 
82 Id. at 92. 
83 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). 
84 Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.  The Court specifically noted that the Kennedy factors migrated 
into ex post facto analysis from double jeopardy jurisprudence.  Id.  Though there has been 
no double jeopardy challenge to sexual offender registration in the Supreme Court, it is 
assumed that such a case would be treated in a similar fashion. 
85 Id. at 97-98. 
86 Id. at 99. 
87 Id. at 99-101. 
88 Id. at 102-03. 
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sex offenders as dangerous, and (3) the passive nature of the notification 
system.89 
3.  Substantive Due Process 
Though the Court in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe 
expressly declined to rule on whether sexual offender registration and 
notification provisions violate the substantive due process guarantees of the 
Constitution,90 five circuits have ruled that they do not. 
In Paul P. v. Verniero,91 an individual subject to the registration and 
notification requirements of New Jersey’s Megan’s Law filed a substantive 
due process challenge based on the infringement of zones of privacy 
guaranteed by Roe v. Wade,92 specifically the “personal rights that can be 
deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”93  
The Third Circuit held that insofar as the individual’s status as a sexual 
offender is disclosed, it is a matter of public record and accordingly does 
not infringe upon a privacy interest.94  With regard to the publication of the 
individual’s home address, the court held that the public interest served 
through notification outweighs the privacy interest and denied the claim.95 
In Gunderson v. Hvass,96 the offender (Gunderson) was originally 
charged with a violent sexual offense, but bargained to plead guilty to 
assault in exchange for the dismissal of the original indictment.97  
Gunderson later learned that he was still required to register as a sexually 
violent predator under the Minnesota registration and notification scheme, 
since his conviction arose out of the same set of circumstances as the 
predatory offense.98  Gunderson argued that the statute infringed upon the 
 
89 Id. at 102-06. 
90 538 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). 
91 170 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 1999). 
92 410 U.S. 113 (1972). 
93 Paul P., 170 F.3d at 399 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 152). 
94 Id. at 403-04. 
95 Id. at 404. 
96 339 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2003). 
97 Id. at 641-42. 
98 Id.  This aspect of the Minnesota scheme is quite a departure from the general basis for 
states to impose registration requirements.  Registration is required for every convicted 
defendant so long as they are only alleged to have committed a sex offense.  Id.  Apart from 
its incompatibility with the Court’s reasoning in Smith v. Doe, see infra note 100, this “facts 
and circumstances” registration system has serious negative implications for criminal 
defendants.  Criminal defendants do not even have the protections of a criminal trial before 
they are subjected to the harms of registration and notification.  This problem is only 
exacerbated by the practice of prosecutorial overcharging to exert leverage in plea bargains.  
See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 368 n.2 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(describing the practice of prosecutorial overcharging in plea negotiations). 
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fundamental right to the presumption of innocence.99  The Eighth Circuit 
applied a two-part analysis to his substantive due process claim.  Relying on 
Smith v. Doe,100 the court held that the statute is civil and non-punitive, and 
therefore there was no presumption of innocence upon which it could 
infringe.101  Since there is no infringement on a fundamental right, the state 
need only show a rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose.102  
The stated purpose of that portion of the registration scheme was “to insure 
the inclusion in the registration rolls, of all predatory offenders, including 
those who take advantage of favorable plea agreements.”103  Accordingly, 
the claim was denied.104 
Doe v. Tandeske was a subsequent appeal of the Smith v. Doe case,105 
this time on substantive due process grounds.106  The Ninth Circuit did not 
explicitly state its basis for denying the claim, but it appeared to rely upon 
the lack of “deep[] root[s] in our history and traditions” to determine that 
sexual offenders do not have a fundamental right to be free from 
registration and notification.107  The court then relied on Smith v. Doe to 
find a rational relation to legitimate government purposes and denied the 
claim.108 
The Eleventh Circuit also addressed substantive due process for sexual 
offenders in Doe v. Moore.109  The plaintiffs contended that Florida’s 
registration and notification requirements infringed on their fundamental 
 
99 Id. at 643. 
100 538 U.S. 84 (2003).  The Eighth Circuit’s reliance on Smith v. Doe’s determination 
that Alaska’s registration was non-punitive is particularly questionable.  A considerable part 
of the Court’s reasoning that the notification system differed from concededly punitive 
colonial shaming practices was based on the fact that Doe had been convicted of a sexual 
offense.  Id. at 99 (“The [notification] process is more analogous to a visit to an official 
archive of criminal records than it is to a scheme forcing an offender to appear in public with 
some visible badge of past criminality.”). 
101 Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 643; see also id. at 644 (“The fact that such a registration 
policy may, in fact, require the inclusion of persons who are not predators, is not a fatal 
Constitutional defect, since the legislative purpose need only be reasonably related to the 
State's interest, and here that legislative purpose is.”). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 643-44. 
104 Id. at 644. 
105 538 U.S. 84.  For further discussion, see supra Part II.C.2. 
106 361 F.3d 594 (9th Cir. 2004).  Doe also claimed violation of procedural due process, 
but this claim was summarily dismissed in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003).  Tandeske, 361 F.3d at 
596. 
107 Tandeske, 361 F.3d at 596-97 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 
(1997)). 
108 Id. at 597. 
109 410 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2005). 
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rights of liberty and privacy.110  The court disagreed, finding that the only 
right at issue was “the right of a person, convicted of ‘sexual offenses,’ to 
refuse subsequent registration of his or her personal information . . . and 
prevent publication of this information.”111  The court then proceeded to 
follow the holdings discussed above and deny the claim.112 
In 2007, the Sixth Circuit addressed a substantive due process claim in 
Doe v. Michigan Department of State Police.113  The court followed the 
reasoning in Doe v. Tandeske114 and Doe v. Moore115 and defined the sexual 
offender’s infringed rights to be the right to refuse registration and the right 
to prevent publication of information regarding his conviction.116  The court 
then found that the infringement of these rights was rationally related to a 
legitimate government end based on the statute’s intention to assist law 
enforcement in preventing future criminal acts.117 
Though these five circuits seem to have definitively answered the 
question of whether a substantive due process claim is viable, it is 
significant both that the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue and that 
the circuit courts have thus far only addressed the issue in terms of the right 
to be free from registration and notification requirements.  None of the five 
cases have addressed whether a defendant who was convicted pursuant to a 
plea bargain is entitled to the government’s performance of the bargain. 
III.  PLEA BARGAINS AND CONTRACTUAL ANALYSIS 
A.  THEORETICAL EVALUATIONS OF THE CONTRACTUAL PLEA 
BARGAIN 
The plea bargain, as its name makes clear, is most often justified on 
contractual grounds.  The defendant waives his or her constitutional “rights 
to a jury trial, to confront one’s accusers, to present witnesses in one’s 
defense, to remain silent, and to be convicted by proof beyond all 
reasonable doubt”118 in exchange for a reduced sentence recommendation.  
But the practice of imposing penal sentences, however the sentence is 
ultimately determined, resides in no other area apart from criminal law, 
 
110 Id. at 1341. 
111 Id. at 1344. 
112 Id. at 1349. 
113 490 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2007). 
114 361 F.3d 594 (9th Cir. 2004). 
115 410 F.3d 1337. 
116 Doe, 490 F.3d at 500-01. 
117 Id. at 501. 
118 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 264 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(citations omitted). 
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which makes for an uneasy fit in contract law.119  Numerous arguments 
have been made on constitutional as well as contractual grounds both for 
and against the continued practice of plea bargaining.120  For the purposes 
of this Comment, the Supreme Court’s validation of the practice in Brady v. 
United States,121 along with its specific reference to the “mutuality of 
advantage” that results from the bargaining process,122 restricts the 
argument to the contractual sphere. 
The most common contract-based arguments against the practice of 
plea bargaining are acceptance under duress, information disparities, 
disparate bargaining power, and the prohibition on enslavement 
contracts.123  Though each argument has merit, there are equally persuasive 
counter-arguments for each.  The purely contractual analysis of plea 
bargaining by Robert Scott and William Stuntz is particularly on point for 
this purpose.124 
The basis for the duress argument is the notion that the large difference 
between post-trial and post-plea sentences has a coercive effect on the 
defendant.125  However, under basic contract law, the limitation of available 
choices (here, pleading to a lesser sentence or risking a greater sentence) 
does not make the choice less voluntary.126  Information disparities 
produced and encouraged by a party to the contract to the detriment of the 
other party will result in an invalid contract.127  In the plea bargain setting, 
the claim is that the prosecutor has superior knowledge not only of the 
strength of the case but also of the “market value” for such a case.128  
However, the defendant is represented by counsel who presumably has 
experience in the “market,” and the immediate terms of the plea bargain 
more often than not will be limited and clear.129 
Disparate bargaining power is easily analogized to “take it or leave it 
contracts.”130  This power imbalance is thought to enable the prosecutor to 
use leverage to exact specific concessions because the prosecutor is the only 
 
119 Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 1974. 
120 See generally works cited, supra note 1. 
121 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
122 Id. at 751-52 (1970). 
123 See generally Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, supra note 1. 
124 See supra note 1. 
125 Scott & Stuntz, supra note 1 at 1920-21. 
126 Id. 
127 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1981). 
128 Scott & Stuntz, supra note 1, at 1922-23. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 1923. 
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bargaining partner available to the defendant.131  However, each plea 
bargain is an individual bargain, and there is a bilateral monopoly as neither 
the defendant nor the state is free to negotiate a particular plea agreement 
with any other party.132  The cost of trying a case for a prosecutor is far 
greater than the cost of individualizing a bargain, so the rational prosecutor 
has no choice but to negotiate to some sort of agreement.133  
Finally, contracts of enslavement are prohibited to prevent individuals 
from bargaining away their autonomy.134  Where imprisonment is 
concerned, the plea bargain may be viewed as the “offer” of portions of life 
by the defendant as his or her consideration, which should therefore be 
prohibited.135  Scott and Stuntz argue that instead of the bargaining of 
personal liberty, the plea bargain is the exchange of a risk of greater 
sentence for the certainty of lesser sentence.136  Furthermore, the prohibition 
of plea bargaining would result in the reduction of individual autonomy by 
forcing the defendant to undertake the risk of longer imprisonment.137 
While there are considerably more detailed and nuanced arguments in 
contract law for and against the justification of plea bargaining, it is clear 
that the debate is not one-sided, and an academic resolution to the matter is 
not readily apparent.  The importance, then, is the application of such 
contractual arguments in courts. 
B.  CONTRACT BREACH ANALYSIS IN THE COURTS 
While the Supreme Court has not and undoubtedly will not evaluate 
plea bargains on purely contractual grounds, three cases addressing the 
breach of plea agreements demonstrate the Court’s willingness to evaluate 
disputes surrounding performance of plea bargains in traditional contractual 
terms.  These cases demonstrate how a court might determine the existence 
of a breach, the performance required for an enforceable contract, and the 
available remedies. 
 In Santobello v. New York,138 the defendant was offered and ultimately 
accepted a plea bargain whereby he would plead guilty to a lesser included 
offense in exchange for the prosecutor’s promise to refrain from making a 
sentence recommendation.139  The plea was made, but sentencing was 
 
131 See id. 
132 See id. 
133 Id. at 1924. 
134 Id. at 1929. 
135 See id. 
136 See id. 
137 Id. at 1929-30. 
138 404 U.S. 257 (1971). 
139 Id. at 258. 
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delayed, in part because the defendant moved to withdraw the guilty plea.140  
After the replacement of both the original judge and prosecutor, the motion 
to withdraw the plea was denied.141  At sentencing, the new prosecutor 
recommended the maximum sentence for the lesser offense, and the new 
judge imposed it over the defense’s objection that it was in clear violation 
of the plea agreement.142  In reversing the conviction, the Court deferred to 
the state court to determine the particular remedy, but stated quite clearly 
that such a breach of the agreement by the prosecution invalidates the plea, 
as plea bargains must be respected to ensure that the defendant receives 
what is reasonably expected when he surrenders fundamental rights.143  The 
Court stated further that “a constant factor [in plea bargaining] is that when 
a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the 
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or 
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”144  While leaving resolution 
of the issue of the proper remedy due to the defendant in Santobello 
noticeably undecided,145 the Court made clear that the failure of the 
prosecution to perform its end of the plea agreement should result in some 
remedy for the defendant.146 
The Court’s next evaluation of the performance of a plea agreement 
concerned an offer, acceptance, and withdrawal before the plea could be 
entered in court.  In Mabry v. Johnson, the defendant was already 
incarcerated for related offenses when plea negotiations began for a 
separate conviction that had been overturned on appeal.147  In exchange for 
a plea of guilty to the outstanding charge, the prosecutor originally offered a 
sentence recommendation of twenty-one years, to be served concurrently 
with the sentence the defendant was already serving.148  When the defense 
attorney called to accept, however, the prosecutor withdrew the offer, 
claiming it had been a mistake.149  Instead, the prosecutor offered a plea of 
twenty-one years, to be served consecutively to the existing sentence, which 
the defendant ultimately accepted.150  In denying the defendant’s claim to 
 
140 Id. at 258-59. 
141 Id. at 259. 
142 Id. at 259-60. 
143 Id. at 262. 
144 Id. at 262. 
145 In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas stated specifically that in cases of breach of 
plea agreement, the defendant should have the options of specific performance of the bargain 
or reclaiming his right to trial on the original charges.  Id. at 267 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
146 Id. at 263. 
147 467 U.S. 504, 505-06 (1984). 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 506. 
150 Id. 
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compel performance of the prosecutor’s first offer, the Court defined the 
point at which a plea bargain becomes enforceable: “A plea bargain 
standing alone is without constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere 
executory agreement which, until embodied in a judgment of the court, does 
not deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected 
interest.”151  The Court stated further that the defendant’s subsequent guilty 
plea foreclosed any argument for detrimental reliance on the original plea, 
finding that the question of whether the prosecutor was culpable in making 
an offer that was later withdrawn was irrelevant.152  The dispositive issue 
was whether the defendant was deprived of his liberty unfairly.153 
Mabry’s importance goes beyond the affirmation of Santobello’s 
requirement for a remedy upon the breach of plea agreements.  The Court 
clearly stated that a finding of breach first requires the defendant’s 
performance of the plea agreement.  Furthermore, the breach is only 
material if there is a deprivation of liberty; prosecutorial intent or motive 
has no bearing on materiality.154 
The final case regarding the breach of plea agreements considered 
once again the extent of performance required by the parties and the 
determination of a breach.  The defendant in Ricketts v. Adamson was 
charged with first-degree murder in connection with a car bombing.155  The 
defendant agreed to plead guilty to second-degree murder, serve twenty 
years in prison, and testify against his codefendants, in exchange for which 
the prosecution dismissed the charge of first-degree murder.156  The 
phrasing of the agreement is of particular importance in this case.  As part 
of the deal, the defendant pledged to testify and to testify truthfully, or else 
the “entire agreement is null and void and the original charge will be 
automatically reinstated.”157  Additionally, the agreement provided that if it 
was nullified, “the parties shall be returned to the positions they were in 
before this agreement.”158  The defendant made the plea, testified against 
his codefendants, and began to serve the agreed upon sentence.159  
However, the convictions of his codefendants were overturned and 
remanded for retrial.160  When the prosecution sought to have the defendant 
 
151 Id. at 507. 
152 Id. at 510-11. 
153 Id. at 511. 
154 See id. 
155 483 U.S. 1, 3 (1987). 
156 Id. at 3-4. 
157 Id. at 4. 
158 Id. at 9. 
159 Id. at 4. 
160 Id. 
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testify again, he refused unless the government agreed to release him 
following the trial.161  The prosecutor notified defendant’s counsel that he 
was deemed to be in breach of the agreement and reinstated the original 
indictment a month later.162  Once the first-degree murder charge was 
reinstated, the defendant offered to testify, but the government refused, and 
the retrial of his codefendants proceeded without him.163  The defendant 
was subsequently convicted and sentenced to death.164 
The defendant appealed on grounds that the reinstatement of the 
indictment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.165  
The Court declined to uphold the challenge, focusing its analysis on the 
language and performance of the plea agreement.166  First, the Court 
delineated the intended outcomes of the plea agreement and noted that each 
party “received substantial benefits” under its terms.167  Next, the Court 
referenced the specific language of the agreement as the basis for its 
decision.168  The enforcement of an agreement according to the plain 
language of its terms is not itself revolutionary, but is significant here in 
that the Court relied upon the terms of the agreement to infer the waiver of 
a constitutional right.169  Such an inference is particularly noteworthy in 
light of previous statements by the Court that an effective waiver of a 
constitutional right is the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a 
known right or privilege.”170 
The defendant also argued that he could not have waived his double 
jeopardy rights until his disputed obligations under the agreement were 
fully and completely determined by a court.171  The Court found that the 
defendant made a “voluntary choice” when he decided not to testify.  
Ricketts could have testified in the second trial at the risk of not being 
actually required to testify.172  Instead Ricketts chose not to testify and 
instead risked breaching the plea agreement.173 
 
161 Id. at 4. 
162 Id. at 4-5. 
163 Id. at 7. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 8-11. 
167 Id. at 9. 
168 Id. 
169 See id. at 9-10. 
170 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (“[C]ourts indulge every reasonable 
presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.”) (citation omitted). 
171 Ricketts, 483 U.S. at 10. 
172 Id. at 10-11. 
173 Id. 
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Ricketts presents the most striking example of contract law’s presence 
in claims concerning plea bargains.  The Court not only held that the 
language of the plea agreement provided sufficient basis for an implicit 
waiver of constitutional rights, but also held that the loss of constitutional 
rights is within the scope of “damages” that can result from intentional 
nonperformance of the agreement.174 
The wholesale acceptance and usage of contract law in the criminal 
context of plea bargains is not only unlikely, but also undesirable.  While 
contract performance and remedies often can be measured through some 
sort of market valuation, valuation of the utility of human life and 
inalienable rights is a troubling practice for the law to undertake, never 
mind the inherent difficulty.  However, courts clearly have adopted contract 
law determinations of breach and performance.  According to Mabry, actual 
performance of the plea agreement is the precursor to an enforceable 
contract.175  Santobello provides that nonperformance will result in breach 
and remedy for the damaged party.176  Mabry stated that infringement of a 
liberty interest is considered a material breach.177  Finally, in Ricketts, the 
terms of a plea agreement and nonperformance are significant enough to 
implicate waivers of constitutional rights.178  Though this is by no means a 
comprehensive jurisprudence, these cases provide an excellent framework 
for analyzing plea agreements in light of retroactive collateral consequence 
statutes. 
IV.  CHALLENGING RETROACTIVE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCE STATUTES 
UNDER THE SANTOBELLO, MABRY, AND RICKETTS STRUCTURE 
A.  GENERAL FEASIBILITY AND APPLICATION 
Having now established an admittedly scant but informative 
framework for the interpretation of plea agreements, it is possible to 
scrutinize the intuitive argument for defining retroactive collateral 
consequence statutes as breaches of bilateral contracts.  In particular, this 
framework allows for evaluation of the specific circumstances of retroactive 
application of collateral consequence statutes to plea-convicted defendants.  
Furthermore, one can determine the feasibility of a successful challenge and 
the availability of a remedy. 
 
174 See id. 
175 Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507-08 (1984). 
176 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). 
177 Mabry, 467 U.S. at 509. 
178 Ricketts, 483 U.S. at 10-11. 
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According to Mabry, a plea agreement is only enforceable upon the 
entrance of the plea with the court.179  For purposes of the present argument, 
which concerns only the retroactive application of collateral consequences, 
this requirement is moot, as the plea would necessarily have been entered 
for collateral consequences to apply.  The plea agreements at issue here are 
therefore enforceable under Mabry and will not be deemed constitutionally 
insignificant on this ground.  Whether such agreements nonetheless 
“deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected 
interest”180 will be addressed below. 
Under Santobello, the existence of a contract between two parties is 
definitively established when a plea agreement is reached.181  Courts will 
safeguard plea agreements by requiring the parties to perform and fulfill 
promises when they are part of the inducement of (or consideration for) a 
plea bargain.182  For the purposes of this analysis, the plea-convicted 
defendant has a contract with the prosecutor.  Additionally, the prosecutor 
must fulfill promises with regard to sentence recommendations, including 
duration and type of sentence imposed.183  In return, the defendant must 
fulfill his obligations of the agreement upon actual acceptance of the plea 
agreement, which, per Mabry, means after the plea is entered.  Any further 
obligations of the defendant under the contract must also be fulfilled 
according to Ricketts, presumably including serving the bargained-for 
sentence. 
However, the prosecutor acts only in an agency capacity, so the true 
parties to the agreement are the defendant and the government.  The 
defendant does not owe the individual prosecutor the continued obligations 
of service of sentence and other duties specific to his agreement.  The 
converse would also be true.  Under Santobello, the replacements of the 
prosecutor and the judge were irrelevant once the plea was entered and 
enforceable.184  Accordingly, the obligation to fulfill sentencing promises 
lies with the government. 
Both Santobello and Ricketts imply that an actionable breach of a plea 
agreement occurs when parties do not perform.  Under Santobello, the 
failure to fulfill a promise that was an inducement to the agreement is a 
breach.185  The determination of breach in Ricketts was considerably more 
specific to the circumstances of the agreement; however, the Court’s 
 
179 See Mabry, 467 U.S. at 507-08. 
180 Id. at 507. 
181 Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262. 
182 See id. 
183 See id. 
184 See id. 
185 Id. 
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determination that the defendant waived his constitutional right to 
protection from double jeopardy through his intentional nonperformance of 
the plea agreement is significant.186 
In the context of the contract between the government and the 
defendant, the government’s failure to fulfill its promise of a specific 
sentence can be viewed as abreach per Santobello.  Furthermore, the 
enactment of retroactive punitive collateral consequence statutes is an 
intentional act of nonperformance, even though undertaken by a different 
branch of the government.   
A state bargains with the decided majority of defendants in sex offense 
cases; if those defendants complete their agreed upon sentences, it is hard to 
view the retroactive imposition of a registration and notification scheme 
enacted after the bargains as anything but the state reneging upon the terms 
of each of those plea bargains.  The defendant agrees to serve a particular 
sentence, but the state violates this agreement by adding on numerous 
additional postconviction requirements that could not have even been 
contemplated during the actual bargaining process.  In this scenario, the 
state has no constitutional rights to inferentially waive through intentional 
nonperformance.  It is worth noting, however, that intentional 
nonperformance of a plea agreement can have implications that rise to the 
level of waiver of a constitutional right, at least according to the Court’s 
reasoning in Ricketts. 
With regard to remedy,187 Santobello expressly left the issue open, 
though it suggested requiring specific performance of the plea and allowing 
the defendant the opportunity to withdraw the plea as possible remedies.188  
The inferential waiver of double jeopardy for the defendant in Ricketts only 
gives further credence to the availability of a remedy for the wronged party 
in a breach of plea agreement in suggesting that an appropriate remedy 
could be on the order of the waiver of a constitutional right.189  For the 
purposes of the plea-convicted defendant, specific performance of the plea 
agreement would render application of the collateral consequence statute to 
the defendant a breach on behalf of the government and would render the 
retroactive aspect inapplicable under the same logic.  Having completed or 
begun to undertake his bargained-for sentence, the defendant should be able 
to hold the state to the terms of the agreement, and disregard the newly 
enacted statute.  Though it would be of much greater import to those plea-
 
186 Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1987). 
187 The determination of whether such a breach would be material requires much more 
detailed analysis relative to this section, and accordingly is addressed infra, Part IV.B. 
188 Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-63; accord Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 510 n.11 
(1984). 
189 Ricketts, 483 U.S. at 9-10. 
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convicted defendants who are currently incarcerated, the opportunity to 
withdraw the plea would be a considerable remedy for all plea-convicted 
defendants, as they would regain their most valuable consideration in the 
bargain: their waived constitutional rights. 
B.  MATERIAL BREACH AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
The Mabry court identified the “depriv[ation] of . . . liberty in any 
fundamentally unfair way” as the proper standard for a finding of breach.190  
Though the language is more lenient, the court was clearly alluding to a due 
process violation.191  The application of this standard to the posited scenario 
is admittedly daunting, as the Supreme Court and five circuit courts have 
already addressed the issue specifically as it pertains to sexual offender 
registration.192 
The possibility of a finding of a procedural due process violation is 
currently foreclosed by Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe.193  
Similarly, all five of the circuits that have addressed challenges to 
retroactive sexual offender statutes have not found substantive due process 
violations.194  However, in each of these decisions, the defendants claimed 
violations of their liberty and privacy interests.195  In each case, the court 
invoked the first step of due process analysis and began its inquiry by 
crafting its own “careful description of the asserted right.”196  Therefore, the 
asserted claims of liberty and privacy rights were limited to the rights (1) 
not to be compelled to register and (2) not to have one’s personal 
information published.197  Since freedom from sexual offender notification 
and registration is not a right that is, by anyone’s definition, “deeply rooted 
 
190 See Mabry, 467 U.S. at 511.  This would not necessarily be the exclusive definition of 
material breach.  In the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, conditions for a finding of 
material breach include “[t]he greater or less hardship on the party failing to perform in 
terminating the contract; The wilful, negligent or innocent behavior of the party failing to 
perform; The greater or less uncertainty that the party failing to perform will perform the 
remainder of the contract.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 275 (1981).  Each of 
these factors is plainly relevant in this interpretation of retroactive collateral consequence 
statutes. 
191 Mabry, 467 U.S. at 510-11. 
192 See supra Parts II.C.1 & 3. 
193 538 U.S. 1 (2003); see supra Part II.C.1. 
194 See supra Part II.C.3. 
195 See, e.g., Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 399-400 (3d Cir. 1999).  Paul P. in 
particular referenced the “guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy” of Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
196 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). 
197 See, e.g., Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1344 (11th Cir. 2005). 
2010] TWO WRONGS MAKE A WRONG 269 
in this Nation’s history and tradition,”198 each substantive due process claim 
was therefore subject to the highly deferential rational basis standard of 
review.199  Though the stated purposes for the statutes differed in each case, 
each court disposed of the remainder of the two-prong test with references 
to the legislative purposes of the statutes: to deter criminals and protect the 
public.200 
By framing the argument in terms of contract enforcement, the plea-
convicted defendant may be able to make a stronger substantive due process 
claim.  The defendant, when confronted with a retroactive collateral 
consequence statute, could claim a substantive due process violation of his 
right to be free from government impairment of his contracts instead of his 
liberty or privacy interest.201  In keeping with the steps for analyzing a 
substantive due process claim, a more particular description of that asserted 
right would be the right to performance of the obligations specified by a 
plea bargain contract.  As noted above,202 such a right is deeply rooted in 
U.S. history and traditions, as plea agreements have been used and enforced 
in the United States since the end of the nineteenth century at the latest,203 
and gained prevalence in the criminal justice system almost one hundred 
years ago.204  By framing the claim in terms of enforcement of a bargain, 
plea-convicted defendants should have a better chance at least to require the 
courts to provide more than a facial justification from the state statute under 
the rational basis standard. 
A finding of infringement of a fundamental right or liberty interest, 
and the resulting need for strict scrutiny analysis, has been fairly rare in 
substantive due process claims, at least relative to the rational basis 
standard.  It is even less likely that plea-convicted defendants asserting a 
contractual enforcement right would be deemed a “suspect class,” which 
normally provides the basis for strict scrutiny and requires the state to show 
a compelling state interest.205  A possible argument could be made for the 
implementation of intermediate scrutiny, though it has yet to be applied to 
substantive due process claims.206 
 
198 Id. at 1343. 
199 See id. at 1345-46. 
200 See, e.g., id. at 1346-47. 
201 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 10 (“No state shall . . . make . . . [any] law impairing the 
obligation of contracts . . . .”). 
202 See supra Part II.A. 
203 Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and its History, supra note 1, at 19-24. 
204 Id. at 26-27. 
205 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
206 See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
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Though the substantive due process argument on the basis of the right 
to contract performance admittedly relies heavily on a relatively small 
number of opinions to create a possible cause of action, the previous 
practice of challenging collateral consequence laws through direct 
constitutional challenges has to this point been unsuccessful.207  If the 
substantive due process claim can be reframed as an impairment of contract 
performance, and the imposition of collateral consequences on plea-
bargained defendants can be found to be a “depriv[ation] of [] liberty in any 
fundamentally unfair way,”208 then that deprivation will constitute a 
material breach of the agreement.  Plea-convicted defendants would be able 
to make a successful challenge against retroactive collateral consequence 
statutes, and the remedies of rescission and specific performance from 
Santobello209 and Mabry210 would be available to enforce their original 
bargains. 
V.  CHALLENGES FOR THE PLEA-CONVICTED DEFENDANT WHERE THE 
STATE IS THE BARGAINING PARTNER 
A.  SEVERABILITY AND THE SOVEREIGN ACTS DOCTRINE 
The contractual challenge to retroactive collateral consequence statutes 
for plea-convicted defendants relies considerably upon the premise that the 
state as bargaining partner is deemed the equivalent of the state as lawgiver.  
The sovereign acts doctrine, though exclusively applied towards the state in 
commercial contracts,211 nonetheless should be addressed.  The notion of 
severability is particularly relevant in this context, as the judiciary arm of 
the state is the bargaining partner, and the legislative arm is responsible for 
the nonperformance of the contract through passage of the retroactive 
collateral consequence statute. 
Horowitz v. United States212 is one of the more notable cases applying 
this doctrine.  Horowitz contracted with the government for the purchase of 
silk, which he then intended to resell at a profit.213  Horowitz made payment 
as dictated, but the shipment from the government was delayed several 
days, due in part to the government’s imposition of an embargo on silk.  In 
the intervening days between the agreed shipping date and Horowitz’ actual 
 
207 See supra Part II.C.3. 
208 Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 511 (1984). 
209 404 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1971). 
210 467 U.S. at 511 n.11. 
211 30 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 77:56 (4th ed. 2008). 
212 267 U.S. 458 (1925). 
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receipt, the price of silk dropped substantially, causing him to lose over ten 
thousand dollars in the subsequent transaction.214  Horowitz filed suit 
against the government for the amount of the loss.  The Court denied his 
claim under the sovereign acts doctrine, stating that “the United States 
when sued as a contractor cannot be held liable for an obstruction to the 
performance of a particular contract resulting from its public and general 
acts as a sovereign.”215  The Court’s further rationale for the decision, that 
“the two characters which the government possesses as a contractor and as a 
sovereign cannot be thus fused,”216 was cited with approval for seventy 
years afterwards.  In the context of the plea bargain, such precedent would 
clearly be a bar to recovery for the defendant.  The stated intent and purpose 
of every sexual offender registration and notification statutory scheme 
involves some invocation of the protection of the public, which is 
undoubtedly within the purview of “public and general acts as a 
sovereign.”217 
In 1996, the Court retreated from the stance of Horowitz considerably.  
The case of United States v. Winstar Corp. concerned a more complex 
transaction, but addressed the severability precedent of Horowitz directly.218  
Winstar and other financial institutions agreed with the government to 
purchase failing banks, in exchange for preferable regulatory accounting 
treatment on those purchases.219  A subsequent congressional act in 1989 
forbade the favorable accounting practice that had been given to the 
institutions in exchange for their purchase of the failing banks.220  The 
institutions then brought suit on contractual grounds for their lost value.221  
By allowing the suit to go forward in spite of the sovereign acts doctrine, 
the Court severely limited the scope of the pronouncements from Horowitz.  
The government argued that the sovereign acts doctrine requires a showing 
that the legislature acted to avoid the government’s contractual 
obligations.222  The Court found that severability was not so clear and that 
attempts to draw a line between government as contractor and government 
as lawgiver would prove more difficult.223  The Court instead advocated for 
a more holistic approach, achieved “by asking whether the sovereign act is 
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properly attributable to the Government as contractor.”224  If it is not, the 
Court asks “whether that act would otherwise release the Government from 
liability under ordinary principles of contract law.”225 
The sovereign acts defense raises a number of interesting issues in the 
context of the plea-convicted defendant.  Following the Court’s two-step 
approach in Winstar, the first question is whether a collateral consequence 
statute is attributable to the state in its role as a plea bargain partner.  The 
government’s purpose for contracting with a defendant is for the traditional 
purposes of criminal justice: deterrence and retribution.  The legislative 
purpose behind the government’s retroactive collateral consequence statute 
is generally the same: promotion of public safety.226  While the purposes of 
government actions in both the legislative role (enacting collateral 
consequence statutes) and the executive role (prosecuting and bargaining 
with defendants) are more or less equivalent, it is unclear whether collateral 
consequence statutes are attributable to a state government acting in the 
particular capacity of plea bargaining partner.  Government actions in both 
roles are for the same purpose, but the purpose of such acts is broad—for 
the public and general welfare of its citizens—which cuts against a finding 
of attribution.227 
As for the second question in the Winstar inquiry, substituting an 
individual in place of the government as contracting party would allow for 
the sovereign acts defense.  If the defendant had bargained with another 
individual for a fixed-term manual labor contract in return for a waiver of 
his or her constitutional rights, subsequent legislation that extended all labor 
contracts by ten years would not create liability for the defendant against 
the individual.  Accordingly, if the sovereign acts doctrine was applicable to 
plea bargaining, under Winstar it could provide a considerable defense. 
A more recent decision in the Federal Claims Court stated the 
determining factors for the sovereign acts doctrine differently, but in 
keeping with Winstar.  This alternative articulation states that “the inquiry 
into possible ‘targeting’ by Congress is relevant to determining whether the 
alleged breach is merely an incidental effect of a sovereign act designed to 
promote the public good, or instead is a deliberate attempt by Congress to 
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alter its previous bargain with the contractor.”228  Under this formulation, 
the issue is closer.  Sexual offender registration and notification systems 
target anyone who has been convicted of a sexual offense, regardless of 
how that conviction was obtained.  The Walsh Act defines “sex offender” 
as “an individual who was convicted of a sex offense,” without 
qualification,229 and applies to any “individual convicted of a sex 
offense”230 at any time.231  While the stated purpose of the registration 
requirements applies to all offenders, the prevalence of the practice of plea 
bargaining has made plea-convicted defendants the de facto targets of 
retroactive registration and notification requirements.  In 2008, over 88% of 
sexual offense convictions were obtained through plea bargaining.232  
Keeping this percentage in mind, one could also argue that the state must be 
acting deliberately to frustrate these individual plea bargains when it enacts 
these types of registration and notification laws.  
B.  ASSUMPTION OF RISK 
A typical proposed solution to the problems resulting from collateral 
consequences and plea bargaining is to require full disclosure of such 
consequences prior to the acceptance of a plea.233  While such requirements 
are in place in some systems for certain collateral consequences,234 some 
commentators have argued that the consequences that attach to any given 
conviction are both too numerous and disparately codified to be realistically 
disclosed prior to the entry of a typical plea.235  In particular, the court 
practitioners themselves (the judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney) 
cannot accurately identify or anticipate the extent of collateral 
consequences that will result from a particular conviction, especially when 
some of those consequences may be applied retroactively.236  Therefore, an 
argument can be made that the duty and responsibility of information and 
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disclosure should not lie with anyone.  Instead, the imposition of unknown 
collateral consequences on plea-bargained defendants can be justified on 
the grounds that they had assumed the risk of unknown civil sanctions or 
retroactive sanctions to be enacted after the plea is entered. 
This defense appears meritorious, and numerous courts have held that 
there is no duty on the part of the state to disclose the collateral 
consequences resulting from a conviction.237  The application in this 
specific context, however, conflicts with basic theoretical premises of 
contract law.  Since neither party can claim to have knowledge of the 
collateral consequences, the plea-convicted defendant has the option of 
voiding the contract unless the risk is specifically allocated to him.238  Scott 
and Stuntz provide the most reasonable justification for the voiding power 
of the plea-convicted defendant in their risk-centered description of the plea 
bargain: 
Before contracting, the defendant bears the risk of conviction with the maximum 
sentence while the prosecutor bears the reciprocal risk of a costly trial followed by 
acquittal.  An enforceable plea bargain reassigns these risks.  Thereafter, the 
defendant bears the risk that a trial would have resulted in acquittal or a lighter 
sentence, while the prosecutor bears the risk that she could have obtained the 
maximum (or at least a greater) sentence if the case had gone to trial.239 
While the prosecutors may not have the duty to inform, there is simply no 
justification for the plea-convicted defendant to bear the risk of the mutual 
lack of knowledge of collateral consequences that are in effect an extension 
of his or her sentence. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The practice of plea bargaining and the extensive imposition of 
collateral consequence statutes are both justified for practical reasons, and 
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the prevalence of each in the United States criminal justice system 
represents an acceptance, if not a full embrace, of each.  Both practices are 
also subject to extensive criticism, largely stemming from often legitimate 
concerns about the protection of individual criminal defendants.  Both 
practices have been challenged individually on numerous constitutional 
grounds, and both have withstood that scrutiny more often than not. 
The overwhelming presence of both collateral consequences and plea 
bargaining has led to the inevitable combination of the two.  At this point of 
intersection, the criticisms find more resonance, and the theoretical 
justifications seem less suited to the task.  My argument has focused on one 
particular act, the Walsh Act, primarily because it seems to embody the 
most dangerous aspects of both practices retroactivity for collateral 
consequence statutes and extended punishment for plea bargaining hidden 
in a civil sanction. 
Both practices have numerous supporters and detractors in legal 
scholarship, but their existence in the courts provides the most substance 
with which to analyze both systems.  The fundamental theoretical 
justification for plea bargaining, freedom of contract, has been both 
recognized and adopted by the courts.  Collateral consequence statutes, 
specifically with regard to sexual offender registration, have been 
challenged numerous times on constitutional issues, and thus had the 
greater survey of precedent. 
Having adopted a limited framework for the analysis of plea 
bargaining, I intended to create an argument for the defendant that resides at 
the intersection of both practices.  Though the contract-based approach for 
which I advocate requires some longer logical leaps than others, the plea-
convicted defendant has a possible means of defending against the 
retroactive collateral consequence statutes that the Walsh Act represents.  
What is most important about the process is the recognition that plea 
bargaining and collateral consequences have an uneasy coexistence 
constitutionally, regardless of their pervasiveness in the U.S. criminal 
justice system.  Additionally, it is possible that this type of argument may 
have already won in a federal court. 
Currently, Nevada’s attempt to implement the requirements of the 
Walsh Act is enjoined by a federal district court order.240  The American 
Civil Liberties Union of Nevada and a number of unnamed plaintiffs filed 
suit to enjoin Nevada’s enactment of Assembly Bill No. 579, which would, 
 
240 See ACLU v. Masto, No. 2:08-cv-00822-JCM-PAL, at *4 (D. Nev. Oct. 7, 2008) 
(granting a permanent injunction), appeal docketed, No. 08-17471 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2008) 
(order granting preliminary injunction); see also Carri Geer Thevenot, Offender Statute 
Restricted, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Sept. 11, 2008, at A1. 
276 KEVIN O’KEEFE [Vol. 100 
among other things, require retroactive application of sexual offender 
registration and notification and replace Nevada’s previous forward-looking 
classification system with a conviction-based scheme.241  Though the 
district court in ACLU of Nevada v. Masto based its opinion on 
constitutional grounds that, as noted above, have already been invalidated 
by the Supreme Court (the Ex Post Facto Clause, procedural due process), 
the court also stated that the new registration system violated the Contracts 
Clauses of both the U.S. and Nevada Constitutions.242  While the case has 
yet to be heard by the Ninth Circuit, and the injunction order was not 
accompanied by an opinion, Masto indicates that courts are willing to 
consider arguments based on performance of plea bargains.  At the very 
least, it has held up enforcement of the Walsh Act in Nevada. 
While this legal argument could easily be invalidated by a number of 
minor adjustments to either system, more likely than not, these minor 
adjustments would affirm some of the rights of the defendant that carry less 
weight in the current system.  Some proposals for adjustments that I have 
come across include requiring disclosures of all possible future collateral 
consequence to criminal defendants, regardless of their plea; promoting 
entirely forward-looking risk assessments of sexual offenders upon release; 
requiring individualized assessments of sexual offenders for tier 
designations and notifications; presenting the defendant with the option to 
try his case, plea bargain, or be tried by an informal bench tribunal; 
requiring all plea bargains to be made and executed in writing; and, perhaps 
most importantly, increasing resources for indigent criminal defense, 
prosecutors’ offices, and the judiciary.243 
The practices of plea bargaining and collateral consequences are far 
too pervasive to continue without a challenge that specifically addresses the 
combinations of the two.  I believe that there is a reasonable argument in 
contract to support that assertion. 
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